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COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Affirmative Action in the Public
Sector: The Admissibility of Post-enactment Evidence of
Discrimination to Provide a Compelling Governmental
Interest'
The theory of affirmative action acknowledges a contradiction in the democratic
promise of equality and the practical consequences of hundreds of years of
slavery, oppression, and segregation.2 Affirmative action proponents argue that
the United States can only be a color-blind society after minorities are put in a
competitive position.' Affirmative action programs accomplish this through a
complex system of setting "minority hiring goals" and giving "preferences" to
minorities applying for certain state and local government contracts or
employment positions." However, as the United States completes its third full
decade without de jure segregation, many courts, legislatures, and political
commentators continue to question the wisdom and legality of affirmative action
programs.
I. While courts have extended affirmative action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
private sector through Title VII, Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
that an affirmative action program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires courts
to apply strict scrutiny to all federal affirmative action programs), this comment only deals with the
analysis of state and local government affirmative action programs. Throughout this comment, the terms
"public," "state and local," and "governmental entity" are used interchangeably to distinguish affirmative
action programs implemented by state or local governments, which are subject to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from private affirmative action programs, which generally are not
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment because of the state-action requirement.
2. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
(1984).
3. See id.; see also WILLIAM BOWEN & DERECK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
4. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACMION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 42 (1991) (defining affirmative action as an attempt to bring members of an
underrepresented group to a higher level of participation in some beneficial program); Adam Winkler,
Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 923, 926 (1995)
(defining affirmative action as "the use of race consciousness in a preferential manner intended not to
stigmatize, but to provide a modicum of equality to members of those groups that historically have been
the victims of discrimination and subordination").
5. Compare BOWEN & BOK, supra note 3 (defending the use of affirmative action), and HACKER,
supra note 2, and John C. Duncan, The American 'Legal' Dilemma: Colorblind I/Colorblind I1 - The
Rules Have Changed Again, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 315 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
move to a "colorblind" Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence prevents progressive social and
governmental progress in the area of race relations), with DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM (1995),
and STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION,
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While the Supreme Court has yet to formally end affirmative action, a series
of decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s have seriously limited its application in
the state and local context." In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education' and City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the application of strict
scrutiny to all race-based affirmative action programs. To satisfy this test, the
governmental entity seeking to impose a race-based preference must show a
"compelling state interest" for maintaining the program and must illustrate how
the particular plan is "narrowly tailored" to fulfill the purported interest."
Currently, the Supreme Court has only accepted remedying past or present
discrimination as a sufficiently compelling interest to justify an affirmative action
program."
Since Wygant and Croson, district and circuit courts have had difficulty
applying the strict scrutiny test." One of the questions not answered in these
INDIVISIBLE (1997) (criticizing the use of affirmative action and supporting a "colorblind" society).
6. See Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis in Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 881, 882 (1996) (noting the decline in viable affirmative action programs); Charles R. Lawrence
111, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 757, 763 (1997) (observing
that City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena have seriously limited
the scope of affirmative action programs in the workplace); Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action
on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action and the Case for Its Retention, 40 How. L.J. 145, 161
(1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court has seriously limited affirmative action); Benjamin A. Doherty,
Comment, Creative Advocacy in Defense of Affirmative Action: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of
Proposition 209, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 91, 91-93 (arguing that the trend in federal cases indicates that
affirmative action has come to an end); Erin M. Hardtke, Note, Elimination of Race As a Factor in Law
School Admissions: An Analysis of Hopwood v. Texas, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1135, 1159 (1997) (arguing
that the Hopwood case carries persuasive value and could mark the end of affirmative action in public
education); Margaret A. Sewell, Note, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Armageddon of
Affirmative Action, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 611, 648 (1997) (explaining that the Supreme Court's application
of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs could mark the end of affirmative action as we
know it).
7. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
8. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9. Id. at 507-08.
10. See Messner v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting diversity as a compelling
state interest for a race-conscious plan); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting diversity in the student body as a compelling state interest); Hayes v. N. State Law
Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting diversity as a compelling state
interest for a race-conscious plan); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the argument that a poor reputation in the African American community and a climate on campus that
is perceived as being racially hostile is sufficient evidence of present effects of past discrimination to
justify a university's affirmative action program); Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 206-07
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting diversity as a compelling state interest for a race-conscious plan); see also
Andy Portinga, Racial Diversity As a Compelling Governmental Interest, 75 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV.
73, 85 (1997); Susan M. Maxwell, Note, Racial Classifications Under Strict Scrutiny: Policy
Considerations and the Remedial-Plus Approach, 77 TEX. L. REV. 259, 259 (1998).
Ii. See Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict
Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 679, 680 (1995); Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tensions: The




landmark cases, or their Supreme Court progeny, involves the admissibility of
post-enactment evidence of discrimination to provide a compelling governmental
interest.' 2 Post-enactment evidence is evidence compiled by a state or local entity
after implementation of the affirmative action program, while pre-enactment
evidence is evidence compiled by the governmental entity before implementing
the affirmative action program."
The dispute over the admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination
arises when a city or state compiles statistical or anecdotal evidence of past
discrimination after the affirmative action program has been put into effect."' A
governmental entity might collect evidence of discrimination post hoc for a
variety of reasons. Many times the affirmative action program itself mandates
periodic studies to ensure that the program is still needed and that its percentages
comport with the narrow-tailoring requirement of the strict scrutiny test. In
addition, because many governments implemented affirmative action plans before
the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant and Croson, these plans lacked the proper
type and quantity of evidence to justify their existence. Therefore, many states
and municipalities added additional evidence of discrimination to comport with
the higher standard mandated by the Supreme Court. Finally, once an affirmative
action program is attacked by a nonminority plaintiff, many government
defendants have chosen to conduct disparity studies to defend the lawsuit."
Plaintiffs oppose this last classification of post-enactment evidence most
vehemently.
Preventing government defendants from using post-enactment evidence of
discrimination will result in many affirmative action programs being declared
unconstitutional, even though sufficient post-enactment evidence to justify a
finding of past or present discrimination might exist. At the summary judgment
stage, a district court judge must determine whether a defendant in an affirmative
action case has enough evidence of past or present racial discrimination to support
a finding that the defendant has a compelling state interest in maintaining the
Second Generation of Croson-Inspired Disparity Studies, 26 URB. LAw. 485, 485 (1994) [hereinafter La
Noue, Standards]; Douglas D. Scherer, Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of
Croson, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 281, 281 (1990).
12. See Docia Rudley & Donna Hubbard, What a Difference a Decade Makes: Judicial Response
to State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides Ten Years After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 25
S. ILL. U. L.J. 39, 43 (2000) (mentioning that Croson and its progeny failed to address the issue of post-
enactment evidence of discrimination).
13. See generally W. Tenn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Bd, of Educ., 64 F.
Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (laying out the issue of post-enactment evidence of discrimination very
precisely).
14. While some defendants of a particular affirmative action plan may oppose post-enactment
anecdotal evidence of discrimination, all of the circuit cases cited in this comment deal with post-
enactment disparity studies. See supra note 10.
15. See Webster v. Fulton County, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1999), for a good example of
an affirmative action program that mandated periodic studies, added more complex evidence of
discrimination to comport with changing Supreme Court precedent, and conducted additional disparity
studies after a nonminority plaintiff filed suit.
2002]
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program. If there is not sufficient evidence of past or present discrimination, the
district court judge should grant summary judgment for the plaintiff. As this
comment will argue, post-enactment evidence of discrimination can effectively
reveal past or present discrimination. If district courts begin rejecting post-
enactment evidence of discrimination, many affirmative action programs will be
declared unconstitutional at the summary judgment stage despite the existence of
credible evidence of past or present discrimination.
Recently, two district courts, rejecting the position of several circuit courts,
have held post-enactment evidence of discrimination inadmissable. In Associated
Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore"9 and West
Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Board of
Education," both courts rejected racial disparity studies composed by experts
after the implementation of the programs in question. In justification of this
position, the courts cited both the language and the spirit of Wygant and
Croson." This comment argues that these two district court rulings on the
admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination should be overruled
and should not be viewed as a judicial trend limiting admissible evidence in an
affirmative action suit. This comment also demonstrates how post-enactment
evidence should fit within a district court's analysis of an affirmative action
program under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part I of this comment outlines the current Supreme Court standard for
evaluating state and local affirmative action programs under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II considers the use of disparity
studies in affirmative action litigation and explains how the controversy over the
admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination arises. Part III focuses
on the recent challenges of circuit court precedent admitting post-enactment
evidence, while part IV evaluates the conflicting circuit court positions in light
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Croson and Wygant. Part IV also considers
the admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination in light of Shaw
v. Hunt, 9 a Supreme Court decision rejecting the use of post-enactment evidence
of discrimination to justify racial gerrymandering of voting districts." This
comment argues that the logic and policy justifications used in Shaw should not
apply to the affirmative action context. Part V argues that the Supreme Court's
strict scrutiny test only produces just results if all evidence of past discrimination
is examined. Part VI highlights several policy reasons for declaring post-
enactment evidence admissible. Finally, Part VII argues that courts should look
at all available evidence of discrimination when reviewing an affirmative action
program. This section rejects the position taken by several circuits that some pre-
16. 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000).
17. 64 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
18. Associated UtiL, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20; W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
19. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).




enactment evidence of discrimination must be presented before a court should
admit post-enactment evidence of discrimination.
L The Supreme Court's Standard for Evaluating a State
or Local Affirmative Action Program
Affirmative action programs, commonly called "set asides" or "racial preferen-
ces," attempt to eradicate discrimination, both past and present, by increasing
minority participation in a particular employment area.2' Through necessity, then,
affirmative action programs require consideration of race or gender in employment
and contracting decisions. However, these programs, when implemented by a state
or one of its subdivisions, must comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. " Because of these seemingly conflicting mandates and the highly political
and moral implications affirmative action evokes, the Supreme Court has historically
had difficulty reconciling the conflict between the goals of affirmative action and
the Fourteenth Amendment.' Initially, courts drew a strong distinction between
invidious racial discrimination and "benign" discrimination under an affirmative
action plan that sought to "level the playing field" for minorities.' Hence, the
Supreme Court's early decisions sometimes applied intermediate scrutiny to
affirmative action programs.' In Wygant and Croson, the Supreme Court, for the
first time, firmly decided the standard of review for all state and local affirmative
action programs. These two cases collectively set the standards for maintaining a
state or local affirmative action program.
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
The Supreme Court first applied strict scrutiny to a state affirmative action
program in the Wygant decision.' Wygant involved the use of an affirmative
action program to maintain a certain percentage of minority teachers in the Jackson,
21. See Steven K. DiLiberto, Comment, Setting Aside Set Asides: The New Standard for Affirmative
Action Programs in the Construction Industry, 42 VILL. L. REv. 2039, 2041-42 (1997).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
23. Id.
24. See Jamie L. Barker, Back to Basics: A "Functional Strict Scrutiny" Solution to the Affirmative
Action Controversy, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1363, 1365-66 (1996) (showing how affirmative action fits
within an Equal Protection Clause analysis).
25. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal
affirmative action program and questioning the propriety of applying strict scrutiny to state and local
affirmative action programs).
26. Id. at 475.
27. See George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy, 61 ALB.
L. REV. I, 1-6 (1997) [hereinafter Le Noue, Impact] (calling Croson the most significant civil rights case
of the 1980s and explaining its effects).
28. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
2002]
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Michigan, school system. In 1972, due to racial tension in the community, the
Jackson Board of Education (the School Board) considered adding a layoff
provision to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (the CBA) between the School
Board and the Jackson Education Association (the Union). The provision protected
employees who were members of certain minority groups against layoffs." The
School Board and the Union eventually adopted a new provision, article XII of the
CBA, covering layoffs. Among other provisions, the amendment provided that if
the School Board decided to lay off teachers, those teachers with the most seniority
in the district would be retained. However, at no time was there to be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minoriiy
personnel employed at the time of the layoff."
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, the School Board did not adhere to
article XII of the CBA. The School Board laid off minority teachers even though
the number of laid-off minority teachers exceeded the percentage of minority
personnel employed at the time of the layoff." In response, the Union and two
minority teachers filed suit in federal court and eventually prevailed on a breach of
contract claim. 2 After this suit, the School Board adhered to article XII. As a
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, the school laid off
nonminority teachers, while the school retained minority teachers with less seniority.
The displaced nonminority teachers brought suit alleging, inter alia, violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The Wygant Court began its analysis by stating several principles of equal
protection analysis. First, "the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the
challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been
subject to governmental discrimination."' This principle is founded on the belief
that distinguishing between citizens solely because of their ancestry is "odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."" Second,
the Court announced the test used to ensure that any classification based on race
comports with this pillar of American constitutionalism. "Any racial classification
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest... [and] the means chosen
by the State to effectuate its purpose must be narrowly tailored to the achievement
of that goal."'
The School Board offered a "role model theory" to justify its preference for
retaining minority teachers with less seniority than their nonminority colleagues.
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 270-71 (citing article Xl of the Jackson Board of Education Collective Bargaining
Agreement).
31. Id. at 271.
32. Id. at 271-72.
33. Id. at 272; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
34. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982)).
35. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).





The role model theory hypothesized that minority students interact and relate better
with minority teachers.3 Because the district in question was highly composed of
minority students, the School Board felt justified in giving preference to minority
teachers during layoffs. This role model theory was the only evidence offered to
support the minority hiring preference.39
The Wygant Court, in evaluating the evidence presented by the School Board,
first noted:
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is
sufficient to justify a racial classification....
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced
by the District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness.
There are numerous explanations for a disparity between the percentage
of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of
them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind.'
Instead, the Court insisted upon some concrete showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved before allowing the limited use of racial clas-
sification to remedy discrimination."' Based on Supreme Court precedent, the
proper inquiry for determining the existence of actual discrimination by the School
Board was the disparity "between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in
the relevant labor market."
2
Giving instruction to the district court, the Wygant Court explained that "a public
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative-action
program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted."' 3 That is,
the employer must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has
been prior discrimination." It is the trial court's duty to "make a factual deter-
mination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary."' After instructing the lower court on the proper
analysis of an affirmative action program, the Wygant Court held that even if the
School Board could post hoc supply enough evidence of past discrimination to
38. Id at 276.
39. Id. This is significant because the defendants in Wygant did not attempt to use post-enactment
evidence to justify the racial preference.
40. Id. at 274-76.
41. Id. at 275.
42. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)).
43. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
44. Id. This language in Wygant is used as the primary argument against the admissibility of post-
enactment evidence of discrimination.
45. Id. (emphasis added). The italicized "before" and "had" are the basis for the exclusion of post-
enactment evidence of discrimination in West Tennessee and Associated Utility. The two district courts
argued that this language shows that the Supreme Court only looks at evidence of past or present
discrimination compiled before the implementation of the affirmative action program. See infra Part Ill.
2oo021
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provide a compelling governmental interest, the minority preference for layoffs
could not satisfy the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.' Thus, the
Wygant Court specifically failed to address whether a plaintiff could satisfy the
compelling-interest prong of the strict scrutiny test by presenting data compiled after
the statute's implementation.
B. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
While the Wygant decision implicitly overruled prior Supreme Court precedent
applying a less exacting standard of analysis to public affirmative action programs,
the opinion did not unequivocally mandate that courts apply strict scrutiny to all
state and local government minority-preference programs."' This directive would
come, however, three years later in the Croson opinion.
The plaintiff, J.A. Croson Company, bid on a city contract to install a new
plumbing system in the Richmond City Jail. J.A. Croson was the only company to
submit a bid for the contract." However, several years earlier, Richmond adopted
a Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan). The Plan required all contractors
receiving city contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the total dollar amount of the
contract to Minority Business Enterprises.4 J.A. Croson, unable to meet the
requirement, applied for a waiver and was denied." Although J.A. Croson was the
only bidder on the contract, the firm eventually lost the contract and Richmond
resubmitted the contract for new bids."
After the Supreme Court remanded the case to be decided in light of its decision
in Wygant, the case again came before the Court in 1989."' Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, held that the Plan failed to satisfy either prong of the strict
scrutiny standard. 3 First, she noted, the Plan failed the compelling-interest prong
because the City could not specifically show that it had previously discriminated
46. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-84.
47. In Croson, the defendant relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Fullilove. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486-88 (1989). The Fullilove opinion applied intermediate
scrutiny to an affirmative action plan instituted by the federal government. See Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980). Because the Wygant Court did not explicitly overrule Fullilove, many hoped that
intermediate scrutiny would still be applied to certain state and local affirmative action programs. See
Croson, 488 U.S. at 489-92 (clearly distinguishing federal and state affirmative action programs and
rejecting the decisions of those circuit courts that still followed Fullilove when evaluating a state
affirmative action program).
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 482.
49. Id. at 477.
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id.
52. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (remanding the case to be decided
in light of Wygant). On remand, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the program. Croson
v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987). This ruling was appealed and considered in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506. While concurring with the circuit court's decision, the Supreme




against certain minorities when it awarded government construction contracts.5 '
Second, the Plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination because
it afforded members of particular minority groups located anywhere in the country
a preference over other bidders solely based on race.5 According to the Supreme
Court, to satisfy the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test, the program
must only benefit those minority contractors that could have been victim to any
alleged past or present discrimination.56 Since out-of-state contractors normally did
not bid on Richmond construction contracts, the Court found that the Richmond
affirmative action program did not satisfy the narrow-tailoring prong. To satisfy this
prong, the preference program should have been limited to in-state minority
construction contractors.'
In examining the first prong, the majority noted that a compelling governmental
interest is served when a public entity engages in activity to eradicate the effects of
past or present racial discrimination.5 Therefore, if a city could show that it had
in any way participated in discrimination against minority contractors in connection
with the administration of public-works contracts, a city could validly enact
legislation to remedy the effects of that discrimination. 9 The defendant could not
simply rely on a finding of "societal discrimination" to show that it participated in
discrimination against minority contractors.' Instead, a city must offer par-
ticularized findings that could raise an inference that it had indeed, either passively
or actively, participated in discrimination in connection with public construction
contracts.6
To show prior racial discrimination, Richmond relied on the following evidence:
(1) conclusory statements of racial discrimination in the construction industry in
Richmond, in Virginia, and around the nation; (2) statistical evidence that minority
54. Id. at 507-09.
55. Id. at 505-07. Further, the Court noted that the rigid 30% quota used by the City of Richmond
also violated the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test. Id. Justice O'Connor explained that
the preference given a minority group must reflect the amount of discrimination identified by the entity
seeking to maintain the affirmative action program. Thus, the evidence showing a compelling interest
to remedy past or present discrimination also serves as a benchmark for quantifying the preference given
to different minority groups. Id. at 505-09.
56. Id. at 506. The Court also noted that the inclusion of other minority groups such as "Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons" in the Richmond affirmative action program further
illustrates a lack of narrow tailoring. Id. The City of Richmond offered no evidence that these additional
minority groups suffered any past or present discrimination. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 505. To justify a racial classification in its plan, Richmond had to show that it engaged
in prior discrimination, either actively or as a "passive participant." Id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
59. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
60. Id. at 497-99; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-501. In the context of employment and construction contracts, these
"particularized findings" generally require a showing of racial disparity in the "relevant labor market."
The relevant labor market in construction contracts is generally those contractors located in the area
where the contract is to be awarded who are willing and capable of performing the particular construction
contract. Id. at 501-02.
20021
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businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts from the City of Richmond, while
minorities constituted 50% of the city's population; and (3) the fact that membership
of minority contractors in local and state contractors' associations was very low.'
The City of Richmond compiled this evidence prior to implementing the Plan and
presented it during a public hearing to debate the adoption of the program."3 The
City did not offer any post-enactment evidence of discrimination. '
The Court found this pre-enactment evidence insufficient to raise an inference
that Richmond participated in racial discrimination within its construction
industry.' The Court instead found the City's conclusory evidence of racial
discrimination of little or no probative value in establishing identifiable
discrimination against minority contractors in Richmond. ' Justice O'Connor
reiterated that generalized findings of discrimination in society will not suffice to
prove the necessary level of specific discrimination.'7 The Court also found the
disparity between minority businesses receiving contracts and the minority
population of the City insufficient to prove discrimination. The relevant labor
pool, for purposes of identifying discrimination in the construction industry,
consisted of the number of minority contractors qualified to undertake contracting
work on city projects compared to the number of those minority contractors actually
awarded contracts. ' Finally, the Court found that the low number of black
memberships in state and local contractor associations could not establish
identifiable racial discrimination because many possible explanations besides racial
discrimination existed for this lack of participation."
Under the second half of the strict scrutiny test, the Court found it almost
impossible to determine whether the Plan was narrowly tailored to rectify past racial
discrimination because the Plan failed to satisfy the compelling-governmental-
interest prong.7 However, apparently as guidance for the future, the Court did
explain that to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement, governments should explore
race-neutral alternatives to any set-aside programs and avoid rigid quotas. In both
Wygant and Croson, the Court acknowledged a compelling governmental interest
in remedying both contemporaneous discrimination in a particular industry and the
present effects of discrimination." However, "[b]ecause racial characteristics so
62. Id. at 499-500.
63. Id. at 479-80.
64. The two courts rejecting the use of post-enactment evidence conceded that the Crosn Court was
not confronted with the issue. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
65. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
66. Id; at 500.
67. Id. at 499. The Supreme Court. after Croson, will focus on concrete empirical evidence of
discrimination. See La Noue, Impact, supra note 27, at 36.
68. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
69. Id. at 501-02. Disparity studies must focus on these numbers to meet the Croson standard. See
La Noue, Standards, supra note 1I, at 496-97.
70. Croson, 488 U.S. at 503.
71. Id. at 507.
72. Id. at 507-08.




seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and because classifications
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic," the reasons for
any such classifications must be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.7'
After Croson, it is clear that the evidentiary burden placed on an affirmative
action defendant is quite high. Most courts have interpreted Wygant and Croson to
collectively require statistical evidence of discrimination before a state may use
affirmative action as a remedy." However, neither opinion considered the use of
post-enactment evidence of discrimination to satisfy this lofty standard.' The
Wygant Court decided the case based on the defendant's inability to satisfy the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test. The defendant in Wygant only offered the
role model theory as justification for the affirmative action program." The role
model theory is not empirical evidence that can be classified as pre- or post-
enactment evidence of discrimination. Thus, the precise holding in Wygant should
have no bearing on the admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination.
As for Croson, the Court ultimately held that all of the pre-enactment evidence of
discrimination, the evidence viewed by the Richmond City Council when it decided
to adopt the affirmative action program, was insufficient to establish past or present
discrimination.7 The defendant in Croson never sought to admit any post-
enactment evidence of discrimination."9 Therefore, the two cases should be viewed
as guidance to deciding what types of evidence are sufficient to show past
discrimination, rather than a firm command against the use of post-enactment
evidence.
11. The Importance of Identifying Past or Present Racial Discrimination and the
Use of Disparity Studies
After Wygant and Croson, identifying past or present discrimination is a condition
precedent to legally implementing an affirmative action program.' In order to
satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, an affirmative action defendant must
identify with relative certainty either past discrimination or the present effects of
past discrimination in a particular industry." No longer are rhetorical statements
or sweeping generalizations sufficient to establish racial classifications.' Instead,
74. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
75. See Rudley & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 56-90 (examining several post-Croson affirmative
action cases and noting their heavy reliance on statistical data).
76. See supra notes 37-38, 62-64 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
80. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-95 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-95.
82. Both Wygant and Croson rejected the use of generalized assertions of societal discrimination
or even nationwide discrimination in a particular industry. The Supreme Court requires particularized
findings that the specific industry that seeks to implement the affirmative action program either is
currently discriminating against minorities or has discriminated against minorities in the past. Id at 498-
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contemporary analysis of an affirmative action program focuses on the use of
disparity studies. 3
A. The Emergence of Disparity Studies to Identify Discrimination
Conducting disparity studies has become the "business" of affirmative action."
As of 1998, 140 state and local jurisdictions spent over $55 million conducting
disparity studies." Disparity studies are judicially recognized as the best indicators
of racial discrimination within a particularized industry.' These highly technical
and expensive tests seek to compare the number of minorities available to perform
a particular job or contract with the number actually chosen to perform the job."
Where "significant statistical disparity [exists] between the number of qualified
minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number
of such contractors actually engaged by the locality, . . . an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could arise."'
While disparity studies generally provide the most effective evidence of past
discrimination, plaintiffs frequently challenge these studies in affirmative action
suits." The expense, quality, and methodology utilized differs significantly
depending on the individual or group conducting the study.' Also, because the
methodology and effectiveness of disparity studies have so rapidly advanced over
the last decade, most tests utilized in the early 1990s are obsolete today. 1 The
most effective studies rely on information compiled from employment contracts
documenting the race, gender, and nationality of employees or contractors."
However, in many situations these statistics have not been properly maintained or
503; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276-79.
83. See George R. La Noue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability of Minority Businesses for
Public Contracting After Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 793, 793-97 (1998) [hereinafter La Noue,
Who Counts?].
84. Id. at 797.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 795.
87. Id. at 795-96.
88. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; see also Rudley & Hubbard, supra note 12, at 42.
89. In all of the following cases, plaintiffs challenged the validity of the particular disparity study:
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding the City's affirmative
action program was not narrowly tailored in light of the disparity study offered in the program's defense);
Associated Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a disparity study that sought to justify a 5% preference for minority and women contractors
in California based in part on a lack of discovery by the plaintiff); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am.
v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Ohio 1996), vacated and remanded, 172 F.3d 411 (6th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the City's disparity study based on improper methodology).
90. See La Noue, Who Counts?, supra note 83, at 797-98. There are currently five firms that
account for about 60% of all existing disparity studies: (1) Browne, Bortz and Coddington; (2) D.J.
Miller; (3) MGT of America; (4) Mason Tillman Associates; and (5) National Economic Research
Associates. Id.





they only date back a few years.93 To compensate for this problem, many studies
are based on less reliable industry-wide surveys.' Because no uniform system for
calculating the disparity in minority hiring in a particular industry exists, affirmative
action defendants often place the fate of their programs in the hands of the best
statisticians they can afford."' Depending on the jurisdiction, that particular study
may or may not satisfy the court."
B. Three Ways Plaintiffs Challenge Disparity Studies As Inadmissible Post-
enactment Evidence
While the evolution of disparity studies has helped affirmative action proponents
identify discrimination with the particularity required by the Supreme Court, it has
also given rise to the controversy over the use of post-enactment evidence of
discrimination. There are three scenarios in which nonminority plaintiffs may seek
to challenge disparity studies as inadmissable post-enactment evidence of
discrimination.97 First, plaintiffs may challenge a disparity study prepared for the
purpose of litigation. In this situation, the affirmative action program was not
thoroughly researched before its implementation, and the defendants gathered
evidence to support the program only after the lawsuit was filed."' Most set-aside
programs based on conclusory anecdotal evidence have been updated with some
form of disparity study. However, even a decade after Croson's firm mandate, some
affirmative action programs are still based on constitutionally insufficient anecdotal
evidence, and the governmental units plan to conduct their first disparity study only
if needed in preparation for litigation.' Second, there are those instances in which
a state or political subdivision conducted some type of study before implementing
the preference program, but seeks to update the study in preparation for
litigation." Third, some affirmative action programs mandate periodic disparity
studies and appoint an individual or panel to reevaluate the program.' These




96. Id. at 805-24 (noting that federal courts have not applied consistent standards when evaluating
the merits of a disparity study).
97. All of the circuit court opinions addressing the issue of post-enactment evidence fall into either
the second or third category. See infra note 104 (listing the circuit court opinions that have addressed
the issue of post-enactment evidence).
98. These are the types of post-enactment studies that plaintiffs challenge most frequently.
99. See Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997), for an example of a
municipality that implemented an affirmative action program based purely on an assumption of past
discrimination.
100. Many times, affirmative action programs begin in this second category and are amended to
require periodic disparity studies.
101. All of the circuit court cases addressing post-enactment evidence involved affirmative action
programs that had been amended to require periodic studies by the time the case came to trial. See infra
note 104 (listing the circuit court opinions addressing the admissibility of post-enactment evidence).
102. See Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that an affirmative action
plan that does not have a periodic reevaluation requirement and appears on its face to run indefinitely
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Without periodic reevaluation, the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test
will rarely be met." Should the Supreme Court choose to exclude post-enactment
evidence of discrimination, all three types of evidence, even disparity studies used
to update or amend affirmative action programs, will not be admissible to show a
continuing need for remedial racial preferences.
C. Circuit Courts Approve the Use of Post-enactment Evidence of Discrimination
All circuit courts that have visited the issue of admitting post-enactment disparity
studies to provide a compelling state interest have admitted the evidence."
However, several of the courts have required some pre-enactment evidence of
discrimination before a defendant may use a post-enactment study to validate the
belief that discrimination exists in the particular industry."W Those circuits that
only allow post-enactment evidence if accompanied by some pre-enactment
evidence, the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits, do so on the basis that it would be
impossible to narrowly tailor an affirmative action program without some evidence
of discrimination before the legislative body implementing the program." Thus,
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits assume that unless the governmental entity responsible
for the affirmative action program had some evidence of past discrimination when
it began the program, the state actor could not have formulated guidelines for the
program that would satisfy the narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test.
0 7
cannot satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirement); NAACP v. Seibels. 31 F.3d 1548, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1994)
(requiring the district court to rewrite the decree to make clear that the annual goals cannot last
indefinitely); see also John Cocchi Day, Comment, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections
on a Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REv. 59, 111-15 (2001).
Lower courts have generally maintained that an affirmative action plan must be "flexible" to satisfy the
narrow-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test. This "flexibility" includes requiring periodic updates
to the affirmative action program to make sure the plan's preference numbers comport with the current
disparity in the particular labor market. Id.
103. See Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994)
(explaining the importance of post-enactment evidence in determining whether an affirmative action
program is narrowly tailored).
104. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (1lth Cir. 1997)
(reaffirming the Eleventh Circuit's position on admitting post-enactment evidence of discrimination);
Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (allowing post-enactment
evidence of discrimination if there is enough pre-enactment evidence to establish a good-faith belief that
the entity implementing the program found past discrimination in the industry); Seibles, 31 F.3d at 1548
(allowing post-enactment evidence of discrimination even in the absence of any pre-enactment evidence);
Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (2d Cir. 1993) (admitting post-enactment evidence);
Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering all
evidence of past discrimination by the State or its subdivision); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941
F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring some pre-enactment evidence of discrimination to satisfy Croson, but
also considering post-enactment evidence); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908 (1 Ith Cir.
1990) (allowing the wholesale use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination); see also Builders Ass'n
v. County of Cook, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that the Seventh Circuit has not
ruled on the admissibility of post-enactment evidence and holding that post-enactment evidence could
be sufficient to support race-based or gender-based preferences).
105. See Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral, 941 F.2d at 920.
106. See Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral, 941 F.2d at 920.




Neither the Ninth nor Tenth Circuit has explained how much pre-enactment
evidence is needed before a court should admit post-enactment evidence."
III. Two District Courts Reject Circuit Court Authority and Declare Post-
enactment Evidence of Discrimination Inadmissable
A. West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Board of
Education
In the summer of 1999, a case out of the Western District of Tennessee challenged
the strong circuit court authority for admitting post-enactment evidence of
discrimination. In West Tennessee Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Board of Education," a Tennessee district court located in the Sixth Circuit rejected
the use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination in an affirmative action lawsuit.
Because the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of post-enactment evidence,
the West Tennessee court's decision could create a split among circuit courts.
In West Tennessee, the court evaluated a plan adopted by the City of Memphis (the
City) and the Memphis Board of Education (the Board) creating a Minority and
Women Business Enterprise Program (MWBE)."'° The program required non-
minority prime contractors to meet certain goals with respect to using minority-owned
subcontracting companies."' The City and the Board originally adopted the MWBE
programs in 1996. Before enacting the plans, the City commissioned DJ. Miller and
Associates to perform a disparity study of public contracting in the Memphis
metropolitan area (the Miller study)."' The study concluded "that [the] consortium
members had actively discriminated against MWBEs in the past and passively
participated in present-day discrimination against minority subcontractors.""' The
City and the Board based their program goals on these findings.""
The plaintiffs in West Tennessee intended to challenge the validity of the Miller
study and sought to point out several flaws in the methodology used in the survey."'
The City then began conducting another disparity study to supplement the Miller study
enactment evidence of discrimination before admitting post-enactment evidence. The courts condemned
plans that had no pre-enactment evidence of discrimination before implementation, reasoning that these
plans could not possibly reflect the actual disparity found post hoc without some evidence of disparity
before the plans' inceptions. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral, 941 F.2d at 920.
108. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral, 941 F.2d at 920.
109. 64 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
110. Id. at 716. It should also be noted that while affirmative action programs based on gender
preferences receive intermediate scrutiny, they should be treated the same as race or nationality for
purposes of the admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination. See GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTUTMONAL LAW 716-20 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's confusion
in regard to gender-based affirmative action).




115. The district court did not address the merits of the Miller study in West Tennessee. Id.
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and to provide more evidence of the need for remedial action. "6 The nonminority
plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to have the post-enactment disparity study
declared inadmissable."7 Citing Croson and Wygant, the plaintiffs asserted that an
entity seeking to maintain an affirmative action program must have a strong basis in
evidence of discrimination before implementing a race-based program. Therefore, any
evidence of prior discrimination by the governmental entities themselves or by the
prime contractors gathered after enactment of the MWBE (post-enactment) is
irrelevant.'
In analyzing the issue, the West Tennessee court first noted that the issue of post-
enactment evidence of discrimination was not squarely before the Croson Court."9
However, the West Tennessee court noted that the language in the Croson opinion
"suggest[ed] that the Court meant to require the governmental entity to develop the
evidence before enacting a plan."'' The West Tennessee court emphasized
Croson's characterization of racial classification as a "highly suspect tool" and noted
that the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" impermissible uses of
racial classifications.'
The West Tennessee court did, however, believe that the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of post-enactment evidence in Wygant. In Wygant, the
Court stated that a public employer "must ensure that, before it embarks on an
affirmative-action program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is
necessary." ' The Wygant majority also noted that it is the trial court's duty to
make sure "the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary."'" The West Tennessee court focused on the
words "before" and "had" in the above Supreme Court quotations from Wygant to
illustrate the Supreme Court's requirement of pre-enactment evidence and rejection
of post-enactment evidence.'25
The West Tennessee court further noted that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Shaw v. Hunt" erased any possible ambiguity in the Wygant and Croson




119. Id. at 717. Since the Croson Court did not address the issue of post-enactment evidence, it is
"not surprising that it did not specifically state whether [a] strong basis in evidence must be developed
before a plan is enacted or whether it is sufficient that the underlying factual predicate is proven at trial."
Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469. 493 (1989)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
124. id. (emphasis added) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
125. Id. The West Tennessee court specifically emphasized that. the word "had" in the Wygant
opinion denotes the past tense. Id. The district court believed this indicated that the Supreme Court
would reject the use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination. Id.
126. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).




district. The Shaw Court looked to Croson for precedent in striking down the
creation of an oddly shaped voting district." Writing for the Court in Shaw,
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "the institution making the racial distinction
must have had a 'strong basis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action was
necessary 'before it embarks on an affirmative-action program."'' 9 According to
the West Tennessee court, the Chief Justice specifically emphasized the word
"before" in the above quoted passage.'" Therefore, opined the West Tennessee
court, the holdings in Wygant, Croson, and Shaw collectively suggest the
following:
[T]he court's task is not to determine if there is now a compelling
interest to justify race-based remedial action; its task is to determine
if the defendants, at the time they adopted race-based plans, had a
compelling interest to act on the basis of race. A compelling interest
is present only if at the time of implementing their race based plans,
the defendants "had a strong basis in evidence for [their] conclusion
that remedial action was necessary. ""'
According to the district court, the strict scrutiny test not only analyzes whether
the factual predicate exists to justify the defendant's action, but also whether the
defendant's actual purpose was remedial.' This standard focuses on the defen-
dant's motivation for implementing the program as an additional safeguard against
impermissible racial classification. Thus, according to the West Tennessee court,
post-enactment evidence provides no insight into whether the governmental body
was actually acting to remedy a problem.'
The West Tennessee court also rejected the defendant's argument that after
offering some pre-enactment evidence, an affirmative action defendant should be
allowed to supplement the record with post-enactment evidence." Under this
standard, a defendant may use post-enactment evidence of discrimination if the
legislative body considered sufficient pre-enactment evidence to establish a good-
faith belief that remedial action should be taken."' Allowing a defendant to
128. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 909-10. Shortly after Croson, the Supreme Court began applying its
affirmative action rationale to voting-rights cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
129. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 910 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
130. W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
131. Id. (alteration in original).
132. Id. at 719.
133. Id. at 719-20. But see Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th
Cir. 1984) (explaining how post-enactment evidence illuminates the motivation of the legislative body
implementing an affirmative action plan).
134. W Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 719. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the position that
post-enactment evidence of discrimination may be admitted only after a showing of some pre-enactment
evidence. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 920 (9th
Cir. 1991).
135. See W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 719-20; see also Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral
Constr., 941 F.2d at 920.
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utilize post-enactment evidence after presenting some unspecified amount of pre-
enactment evidence troubled the court." The West Tennessee court found that
allowing post-enactment evidence after a showing of some pre-enactment evidence
has a propensity to weaken the strict scrutiny test.'37 Lowering the standard from
a "strong basis in evidence" for believing remedial action is necessary to
"sufficient evidence to form a good-faith belief' that race-conscious measures are
necessary only increases the possibility that a legislative body has employed an
unnecessary race-based preference. 3 Under this rationale, there is no difference
between an affirmative action program based on no evidence of past discrimination
and one based on a constitutionally insufficient amount of pre-enactment
evidence.'
Further, the West Tennessee court contended that a lower standard would unduly
burden nonminorities seeking to enforce their Fourteenth Amendment rights."
Allowing the use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination, according to the
district court, could "encourage a government with strong racial political
motivations" to enact a race-based program without thoroughly researching to
determine if such a program is needed.'" If sued, the government could then use
all its powers and resources to support the program.' The West Tennessee court
feared this could have a "chilling-effect" on the prospect of nonminority plaintiffs
challenging unconstitutional affirmative action programs.' 3 The prospective
plaintiff may determine that the governmental entity did not have enough evidence
of past discrimination to implement an affirmative action program, but then decide
not to bring suit for fear that doing so would be futile because the government
could conduct a contemporaneous disparity study to save the program."
B. Associated Utility Contractors of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore
Less than one year after West Tennessee, a Maryland district court in the Fourth
Circuit also rejected the use of a post-enactment disparity study showing racial
discrimination in Baltimore public contracts.' In Associated Utility Contractors
136. W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The West Tennessee court is correct on this point; however, because there is no distinction
between the two situations, post-enactment evidence should be admitted in both scenarios. See infra text
accompanying notes 256-63.
140. W Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
141. See id. at 720.; see also D'SouzA, supra note 5, at 30-49 (discussing the different political
motivations for maintaining racial preferences).
142. W Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000).
On December 17, 1999, the Associated Utility court granted a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the 1999 goals. In granting the preliminary injunction, the court also denied the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment on the facial attack on the ordinance. The opinion in this case came from




of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,'" a nonminority Baltimore contractor
challenged City Ordinance 610 on the basis that it impermissibly used racial
preferences in the allotment of city contracts. In 1986, the Baltimore City Council
enacted Ordinance 790, establishing the first set of city-wide affirmative action
goals. The goals required that for all city contracts, 20% of the value of sub-
contracts be awarded to minority-owned businesses and 3% to women-owned
businesses."" In compliance with the Supreme Court doctrine at the time, the city
council cited general societal discrimination as its justification for the program.' "
In 1990, after Croson, the City formed a task force to hold hearings and submit
findings on specific discrimination in the awarding of public contracts. " In
response to these findings, the City enacted Ordinance 610 to replace Ordinance
790.'" One of the provisions in Ordinance 610 ordered a yearly reevaluation of
the program and required the city council to vote on the continuation of the
plan.'"' However, Ordinance 610 readopted the original goals set in Ordinance
790."' The same set-aside goals had been adopted without dispute every year
since 1990.'" The plaintiff specifically challenged the 1999 version of Ordinance
610.'" Before the plaintiff in Associated Utility filed suit, the City had never
conducted a disparity study.' Further, the City did not keep data from which a
disparity study could be conducted.'" The Baltimore City Council based its
decision to maintain the program on anecdotal evidence and historical studies
outlining discrimination in the letting of Baltimore public contracts."'
The Associated Utility court, like the West Tennessee court, based its decision
to reject post-enactment evidence of discrimination on the Supreme Court's
holdings in Croson, Wygant, and Shaw.' The court in Associated Utility
explicitly adopted the West Tennessee court's interpretation of the three cases and
found a firm mandate against the use of post-enactment evidence in the Supreme
Court's language describing the strict scrutiny test. ' Prior to Associated Utility,
the defendants to conduct further discovery in the form of new disparity studies to justify the program.
Id. at 614-15.
146. 83 F. Supp. 2d 613 (D. Md. 2000).
147. Id. at 614-15.
148. Id. at 615.
149. Id. The task force held hearings and issued a Public Comment Draft Report on November I,
1989. It held additional hearings, reviewed public comments, and issued its final report on April II,




153. Id. at 616.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. The unavailability of data needed to conduct disparity studies is a common occurrence. See
La Noue, Who Counts?, supra note '83, at 797-805.
157. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
158. Id. at 619-21. The Associated Utility court relied heavily on West Tennessee's analysis of the
use of post-enactment evidence. Id. at 621 n.6; see also supra text accompanying notes 117-42.
159. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 620-22.
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the Fourth Circuit had not explicitly rendered an opinion on the admissibility of
post-enactment evidence."W In the Fourth Circuit's seminal affirmative action
cases, Podberesky v. Kirwan'6 ' and Maryland Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans,'2
the court apparently relied (without comment) upon post-enactment evidence when
evaluating two affirmative action plans.'63 However, the Associated Utility court
noted that both Podberesky and Evans were decided before the Supreme Court's
clarification of Wygant in Shaw.'" Further, all circuit court opinions addressing
this issue, except one, were rendered before Shaw.6 Therefore, the Associated
Utility court found the West Tennessee court's interpretation of Wygant and Shaw
controlling.
C. The Practical Consequences If These Two Decisions Are Followed
Proponents of affirmative action programs should be very concerned about the
two district court decisions excluding the use of post-enactment evidence of
discrimination. While the issue is primarily one of procedure, it could have
devastating substantive effects on a state or local government's ability to utilize
affirmative action. In fact, it is hard to imagine any affirmative action program
surviving strict scrutiny without the use of post-enactment evidence.
As extensively explained earlier, the disparity study has become the single most
important factor in a court's decision to accept or reject an affirmative action
plan. The methods and effectiveness of these studies are developing at an
almost unprecedented pace. Due to this fact, many states find that the disparity
studies used to assess their affirmative action programs become outdated almost
before the programs can be put in place.'T If an affirmative action defendant is
limited to presenting only pre-enactment evidence, the court is essentially
excluding the use of evidence that has the highest probability of identifying any
discrimination that may exist. Especially if the affirmative action program has
been in place for several years, the exclusion of post-enactment evidence of
discrimination has a high probability of precipitating an incorrect decision.
160. Id. at 621 n.6.
161. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
162. 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993).
163. Both Podberesky and Evans struck down the challenged affirmative action plans after
examining the defendants' post-enactment evidence. See Podberseky, 38 F.3d at 188; Evans, 993 F.2d
at 1074.
164. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 621 n.6.
165. Id. The Supreme Court decided Shaw on June 13, 1996. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Engineering Contractors is the only circuit opinion explicitly permitting the use of post-enactment
evidence of discrimination rendered after the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw. The Eleventh Circuit
decided Engineering Contractors in September 1997. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade County,
122 F.3d 895 ( 1th Cir. 1997).
166. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 620-22.
167. See supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 84-103; see also Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,




Because contemporary disparity studies are considered more effective at identifying
discrimination, courts almost always require a disparity study done within the last
several years.'1 ° Few, if any, affirmative action programs have satisfied strict
scrutiny without the use of a disparity study using up-to-date methods.'"
Realistically, if the position taken in West Tennessee and Associated Utility is
adopted by the Supreme Court, state-based affirmative action programs will cease
to exist.
IV. Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Specifically Exclude Post-enactment
Evidence of Discrimination
A. Neither Croson nor Wygant Mandates the Exclusion of Post-enactment Evidence
of Discrimination
According to West Tennessee and Associated Utility, both Croson and Wygant
support the exclusion of post-enactment evidence of discrimination.' 2 This
conclusion is not supported by the text or circumstances of the Supreme Court's
opinions in these two seminal decisions. In Croson and Wygant, the Supreme
Court admittedly heightened the judicial scrutiny of affirmative action programs
and demanded more probative evidence of past discrimination.'" The Court,
however, did not foreclose an affirmative action defendant's ability to further
develop evidence of discrimination after the implementation of the set-aside
program.
The pivotal language cited by the district courts to support the exclusion of post-
enactment evidence comes from two Supreme Court opinions that do not deal with
the precise issue discussed in this comment."'4 The issue of admitting post-
enactment evidence of discrimination *vas not before the Supreme Court in Croson
or Wygant.'" While the district courts conceded that the issue was not properly
before the Croson Court, they both used Wygant as controlling precedent." This
assumption is flawed because the Wygant Court did not consider the use of post-
enactment evidence.'" The only evidence of past discrimination presented in
whether an affirmative action program complies with Croson).
170. See La Noue, Who Counts?, supra note 83, at 798-804 (examining different types of disparity
studies).
171. Id.
172. Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-22 (D.
Md. 2000); W. Tenn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 714,
716-17 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
173. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989) (applying the strict
scrutiny test to the Richmond Plan and explaining the type and quality of evidence needed to sustain an
affirmative action program); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-84 (1986) (explaining
why the Court must apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs).
174. See supra Part l.A & B.
175. See supra Part L.A & B.
176. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 620-22; W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17.
177. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76; see aLto supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
2002]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Wygant consisted of the Jackson School District's role model theory." The
school district based this theory on racial assumptions not supported by empirical
evidence.'" In addition, the school district developed the theory and presented
it for public debate before implementing the program."' The school district
offered no post-enactment evidence of discrimination in defense of its racial-
preference program.' Therefore, the language from Wygant cited by the West
Tennessee and Associated Utility courts should only be considered guidance in
applying the strict scrutiny test and should not be considered a mandate against the
use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination.
B. The Supreme Court Did Not Clarify Its Position on the Use of Post-
enactment Evidence of Discrimination in Shaw v. Hunt
The two district courts rejecting the use of post-enactment evidence of
discrimination contended that Shaw erased any ambiguity that possibly existed after
Wygant and Croson."' In Shaw, the Supreme Court condemned North Carolina's
use of racial considerations in drawing voting districts. In doing so, the Court
specifically addressed the issue of admitting post-enactment evidence of
discrimination to provide a compelling state interest.'" However, the Shaw
opinion addressed a distinguishable factual situation; therefore, its exclusion of
post-enactment evidence should not apply to affirmative action cases.
The Shaw court first looked to Croson for the applicable standards used to
assess a state program that purports to classify individuals based on race.'" After
determining that strict scrutiny applied to all such programs, the Court stated that
the defendant must provide evidence of past discrimination in the state to justify
taking race into account when drawing voting-district lines."' However, the
Supreme Court rejected reports outlining discrimination in North Carolina because
the reports were not composed until after the General Assembly drafted the district
lines being challenged in Shaw.'" Thus, the Supreme Court in Shaw held that the
critical inquiry in a suit challenging voting districts is whether the legislature
believed discrimination existed before implementing the program."" According
to the West Tennessee and Associated Utilities courts, by making the legislature's
motive the fact of consequence, the Shaw court rendered post-enactment evidence
irrelevant to the strict scrutiny analysis.'
R
178. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
182. Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-21 (D.
Md. 2000); W. Tenn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 714,
718 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
183. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-11 (1996).
184. Id. at 909-10.
185. Id. at 909.
186. Id. at 910.
187. id.




While the Supreme Court used Croson as precedent for evaluating certain
aspects of voting-rights cases, Shaw should not be used as precedent for excluding
post-enactment evidence in other affirmative action cases." There is a critical
distinction between the use of racial classifications in drawing voting districts and
the use of race in other affirmative action contexts. The drawing of voting
districts is one of the most politically contentious activities conducted by a
legislature.'"' Politicians have historically used gerrymandering to manipulate the
political process and bolster their parties' positions within the legislature."2
Because of this fact, the actual motive for drawing race-conscious voting districts
may involve a subversive attempt to gain political power and have little to do with
an individual's right to be free from discrimination."' Therefore, there exists a
strong need to determine the legislature's motive for drawing voting lines in a
particular pattern."
This need to focus on the legislative body's motive is not equally portentous in
other affirmative action contexts. The typical affirmative action program,
especially in the public-employment realm, deals more with distributive justice for
the individual and less with party-line political considerations. Admittedly, when
an affirmative action program is considered, legislators sometimes have political
motives other than mending harms done by slavery, segregation, and contem-
poraneous discrimination. However, those considerations are not as deeply
intertwined in the decision-making process. While a legislator's decision to support
an affirmative action program giving preference to certain minority contractors
may cost him or her some votes in the next election, the choice does not affect the
political party in the same manner as voting-district decisions. Thus, the motive
for implementing an affirmative action program is not as important as the motive
behind the drawing of voting districts. For this reason, Shaw should not be used
to exclude the use of post-enactment evidence of discrimination in other
affirmative action contexts.
V. The Strict Scrutiny Test Is Only Effective If Courts Are Allowed to Evaluate
All Evidence of Past Discrimination
While the courts in West Tennessee and Associated Utility held otherwise, the
Supreme Court has not rendered any specific indication of its position on the
admissibility of post-enactment evidence of discrimination in an affirmative action
case. As indicated in the above analysis of Croson, Wygant, and Shaw, the
189. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating several differences between "pure"
affirmative action programs and voting-rights cases and questioning the application of interchangeable
legal standards).
190. id.
191. Id. at 941-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id.; see also WILLIAM A. MCCLENAGHAN, MAGRUDER'S AMERICAN HISTORY 213 (rev. ed.
1990) (discussing the use of gerrymandering to manipulate elections).
193. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 941-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See id.
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Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to scrutinize the issue.' 5 Therefore,
a proper discussion of the issue should first examine the standards articulated in
the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test, and then examine the various policy jus-
tifications for admitting post-enactment evidence.
The strict scrutiny test is applied to affirmative action programs to ensure that
states only classify individuals on the basis of race when absolutely necessary.' '
This goal is accomplished through the compelling-interest prong of the
analysis." The entity seeking to give a preference to an individual based on race
must identify the compelling interest of remedying past discrimination with relative
certainty.' 8 Further, once the compelling interest is identified, the use of a
minority-preference program must be narrowly tailored to alleviate the identified
compelling interest."W The Supreme Court utilizes this analysis to make sure
affirmative action programs are used only in the proper circumstance and to the
appropriate extent.' The courts in West Tennessee and Associated Utility
contended that to abide by these principles, a court must focus exclusively on
whether discrimination existed at the time the legislative body implemented the
program.0 ' The courts presumed post-enactment evidence was irrelevant to the
question of whether discrimination existed before the implementation of the
program.' However, allowing a defendant of an affirmative action program to
present post-enactment evidence of discrimination does not circumvent this
Supreme Court standard. Instead, it enables courts to precisely apply the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test and determine whether prior discrimination existed.
Due to the nature of discrimination in the United States, the use of post-
enactment evidence increases the accuracy of the compelling-interest prong of the
strict scrutiny test. Discrimination in the United States has frequently changed
shape.0 3 For the most part, employers no longer make racist comments in
conjunction with a refusal to use a minority contractor.' Today, discrimination
is more complex and much less obvious."° But our country's history of
195. See supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text.
196. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-94 (1989); Wygant v. Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1986).
197. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-94 (stating the purpose of the strict scrutiny test.)
198. Id. (describing the type of evidence that may satisfy the compelling-interest prong of the strict
scrutiny test).
199. Id.
200. See Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action
and the Case for Its Retention, 40 How. L.J. 145, 145 (1996).
201. Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-22 (D.
Md. 2000); W. Tenn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 714,
716-19 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
202. See supra notes 119-44, 158-66 and accompanying text.
203. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 3, at 1-14, for a discussion of America's checkered history of
discrimination and how it affects current affirmative action policy.
204. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991) (explaining





discrimination is highly relevant to identifying current unequal treatment. In
addition, the inverse is true. Identifying contemporary racial disparity in a
particular area can indicate a history of discrimination.' This truism is reflected
in the Supreme Court's recognition of remedying both present discrimination and
the present effects of past discrimination as a compelling state interest.' By
including the present effects of past discrimination, the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged that discrimination does not exist in a vacuum.' Past and present
discrimination are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, when a court attempts to
determine whether sufficient evidence of past discrimination exists, the inquiry
becomes more effective if the court considers the particular segment of society
over a long period of time. If a court is limited to using pre-enactment evidence,
the inquiry ends with the creation of the affirmative action program.' This
prevents the court from looking at possible discrimination that may have occurred
after the program's inception. Because in most circumstances discrimination will
not immediately end with the implementation of an affirmative action program,
excluding post-enactment evidence excludes relevant evidence, and many times
excludes the best evidence.
Based on the above analysis, West Tennessee and Associated Utility misapplied
basic principles of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Wygant's requirement that a
state or local legislature have convincing evidence of discrimination before it uses
race-based remedial measures does not preclude the use of post-enactment
evidence of past or present discrimination. Evidence that discrimination does or
does not exist after the implementation of an affirmative action program makes it
more or less likely that discrimination existed before the implementation of the set-
aside plan. Therefore, based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Croson and
Wygant, post-enactment evidence of discrimination is relevant to proving a fact of
consequence: whether sufficient discrimination existed to justify the use of
remedial action.21 °
206. Id. at 55-59.
207. See ROSENFELD, supra note 4, at 135-62 (examining how the Supreme Court applies equal
protection analysis to affirmative action cases).
208. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 492-94 (1989) (recognizing a
compelling state interest in remedying both present discrimination and the present effects of past
discrimination).
209. Both of the district courts sought to limit their own perspectives by excluding post-enactment
evidence. Associated Util. Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Bait., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620-22 (D.
Md. 2000); W. Tenn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 714,
717 (1999).
210. See FED. R. EVID. 401; see also Liberty Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. County of Westchester, No. 94
CIV.7431 (WK), 2000 WL 1341403 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2000) (finding that Rule 401 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires the court to admit post-event evidence in a discrimination suit). In Liberty,
the plaintiff brought suit alleging discrimination by the defendant in its allotment of construction
contracts. Id. at * 1. (It is not clear whether the plaintiff in Liberty was a minority alleging discrimination
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or a nonminority alleging reverse discrimination.) The
defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the plaintiff from offering any evidence at trial of events
that occurred after the alleged discriminatory conduct. Id. The plaintiff contended that two incidents that
occurred after the award of the contract provided circumstantial evidence that the defendant did not
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VI. The Policy Arguments for Admitting Post-enactment Evidence
A. Excluding Post-enactment Evidence of Discrimination Does Not Unduly Burden
Plaintiffs Challenging Affirmative Action Programs
The courts in West Tennessee and Associated Utility based their opinions on
several public-policy considerations."' According to the West Tennessee court,
allowing a governmental unit to use post-enactment evidence of discrimination to
save its affirmative action program would "create a chilling-effect that discourages
non-minorities from protecting their rights.... The district court feared the
possibility of some nonminority individuals refraining from bringing suit because
the public defendant is capable of conducting extensive additional research
throughout the legal process in an attempt to support the plan.2" The plaintiff
would then be forced to "attack a moving target of newly developing evidence to
support past motivations..
214
This argument should not prohibit the use of post-enactment evidence for three
reasons. First, prospective affirmative action plaintiffs are capable of attacking
post-enactment disparity studies in the same manner as pre-enactment studies. 5
In all of the circuits that have adopted the use of post-enactment evidence,
affirmative action programs are still frequently terminated on the basis of flawed
disparity studies.2 16 Second, plaintiffs' attorneys' knowledge and skill in attacking
disparity studies have greatly increased over the last decade." 7 Disputing a
disparity study conducted by a state or local defendant does not require a full-
blown disparity study by the plaintiff.21' Through the discovery process, a
nonminority plaintiff may dispute the defendant's disparity study without
conducting a second study."9 Third, an affirmative action defendant must accept
the findings of a post-enactment disparity study even if the study does not find
discrimination.2 2 ' In some cases, a post-enactment study could actually help a
award the contract to the plaintiff because of a discriminatory animus. Id. In admitting the post-contract
evidence, the court relied on Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at *2. The Liberty court
found the post-event occurrences "highly probative" of a preexisting illegal custom or practice and found
that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at *2, *3.
211. Associated Util., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 620-22; W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 718-20.
212. W. Tenn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521-23 (10th Cir. 1999).
216. See, e.g., Cache Valley Elec. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 149 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1998);
Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir.
1994).
217. See La Noue, Who Counts?, supra note 83, at 797-820.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 911-29 (11 th Cir. 1997),
for a case allowing post-enactment evidence of discrimination but ultimately holding that this evidence




plaintiff show a lack of discrimination."' If this is the case, the defendant cannot
argue that absent an affirmative action program, sufficient evidence of
discrimination would have been found.' Thus, the concern expressed in West
Tennessee is greatly overstated. Affirmative action plaintiffs have ample ability to
challenge post-enactment studies conducted by states.' The courts in West
Tennessee and Associated Utility should have focused more on the harm defendants
would suffer from the exclusion of post-enactment evidence and less on the rights
of potential nonminority plaintiffs.
B. The Possibility of Dual Liability
In NAACP v. Seibels,' the Eleventh Circuit articulated a strong policy reason
for permitting defendants of state affirmative action plans to use post-enactment
evidence to establish a compelling state interest. According to the Eleventh Circuit,
preventing a defendant from using post-enactment evidence of discrimination does
not strike a proper balance between the conflicting civil rights obligations that
public employers face.' If the State fails to act on a reasonable belief that
discrimination exists in a certain industry, minorities may bring suit against the
State for passive participation in discrimination.' Conversely, if the State
implements an affirmative action policy without sufficient evidence of
discrimination, it risks liability to nonminority plaintiffs."7 Because of these
conflicting obligations, a state employer must tread an extremely fine line when
dealing with discrimination.m
Preventing the use of post-enactment evidence would make this already difficult
situation almost unsolvable. Instead of implementing a small-scale program that
is amended as further disparity studies come into existence, a state would be forced
to wait the for the outcome of lengthy disparity studies before taking any action
to remedy the problem.' According to the Seibles court, state defendants should
be able to "act on the basis of information which gives them a sufficient basis for
concluding that remedial action is necessary."'  Then, if the program is chal-
lenged by a nonminority, all of the evidence of discrimination, both pre-enactment




223. La Noue, Who Counts?, supra note 83, at 797-820.
224. 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994).
225. Id. at, 1566.
226. Id. The Equal Protection Clause prevents states from discriminating on the basis of race. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If a state entity is aware of discrimination in an industry, that state must
either attempt to remedy the discrimination or accept liability. See Seibles, 31 F.3d at 1566.
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C. Post-enactment Evidence Should Be Admitted Because of the Harsh
Remedies Plaintiffs May Seek
Another justification for admitting post-enactment evidence of discrimination
involves the type of remedies that nonminority plaintiffs generally seek. 32 In
addition to monetary damages, courts generally grant prospective injunctive relief
to victorious plaintiffs." According to several circuit courts, this type of relief
should only be granted after a court examines all evidence of discrimination.'
In Concrete Works of Colorado v. City of Denver," the Tenth Circuit found
post-enactment evidence of discrimination exceptionally relevant when an
affirmative action plaintiff sought permanent injunctive relief.'
In Concrete Works, the Tenth Circuit examined a city ordinance establishing
goals for participation in the construction industry by minority- and female-owned
businesses."7 In 1990, the Denver City Council passed Ordinance 513 in an
attempt to help minority-owned business enterprises (MBEs) and women-owned
business enterprises (WBEs) participate in public-works projects "to an extent
approximating the level of [their] availability and capacity."' " The City deter-
mined availability and capacity by conducting periodic studies of minority
participation in each contract area. The ordinance also directed the Office of
Contract Compliance (OCC) to establish MBE and WBE participation goals on
each individual city contract. The statutory goals for total annual construction
expenditures were 16% for MBEs and 12% for WBEs."' According to the
ordinance, if the OCC established an individual project goal, all bidders must
either demonstrate how they intend to satisfy the goal or show that they made a
good-faith effort to do so. On January 6, 1992, Concrete Works, a construction
company owned by a nonminority male, filed suit alleging the ordinance caused
232. Most challenges to affirmative action programs are brought by conservative special-interest
groups. While these groups are concerned with the rights of the individual plaintiff, they also want to
make sure the affirmative action program is ended. Therefore, injunctive relief is very important to most
affirmative action plaintiffs. See CARTER, supra note 204, at 222-50 (explaining how conservative
coalitions fighting affirmative action find plaintiffs).
233. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 911 (11 th Cir. 1997); Concrete
Works of Colo. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass'n v. City of
Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1004 (3d Cir. 1993).
234. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 911 (citing Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521).
235. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
236. Id. at 1521. Ultimately, the Concrete Works court took the position that some pre-enactment
evidence of discrimination must be offered before the court will look at post-enactment evidence of
discrimination. Id. at 1521-22. However, the argument in this section concerning prospective injunctive
relief applies with equal force to the position that all post-enactment evidence of discrimination should
be admitted.
237. Id. at 1515.
238. Id. at 1515-16.




it to lose three public contracts.' ° Concrete Works' complaint sought a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and damages for lost contracts."
The City of Denver presented three categories of evidence to demonstrate a
compelling interest in enacting the ordinance: (1) evidence of discrimination in city
contracting from the mid-1970s to 1990; (2) data about MBE and WBE utilization
in the overall Denver construction market between 1977 and 1992; and (3)
anecdotal evidence that included personal accounts by MBEs, WBEs, and city
officials who had either witnessed or experienced both public and private
discrimination.' The City implemented the program after compiling an
unspecified amount of the above evidence. 3 A large portion of the evidence,
however, came into existence after the program began.'
After reciting the Supreme Court standards for evaluating state and local
affirmative action plans under Wygant and Croson, the Concrete Works court
addressed the plaintiffs contention that the court should only look at pre-enactment
evidence of discrimination to determine whether the City had a compelling interest
in remedying discrimination in the allotment of local construction contracts." First,
the Concrete Works court noted that the strong weight of authority among other
circuit courts supported admitting the post-enactment evidence.' The court took
special notice of the fact that all courts addressing the issue allowed post-enactment
evidence to come into the record.' 7 Second, the court focused on the type of relief
sought by the plaintiff. Because the permanent injunction sought by the plaintiff
would effectively end the affirmative action program, the court in Concrete Works
believed it should consider all of the available evidence.'
While the Tenth Circuit did not articulate its reason for this concern, it is likely
based on a realization that unlike monetary damages, permanent injunctive relief
affects more than one individual's rights.' Should a court permanently enjoin an
affirmative action program without looking at all of the available evidence of past
discrimination, potential benefactors under the plan are unjustly deprived of state
benefits. Further, as the number of affirmative action programs declared un-
constitutional increases, the possibility of a legislative body replacing these plans
decreases.' This is not to say that unconstitutional affirmative action programs
should not be overturned. The Concrete Works court, as well as this comment, only





245. See id. The Concrete Works court went to great efforts to illustrate the Tenth Circuit's
adherence to Croson and Wygant.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also supra notes 102-04 (listing the circuits that have admitted post-enactment
evidence).
248. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521.
249. Id.
250. See Day, supra note 102, at 69-80 (noting the differing opinions on whether affirmative action
programs can and do survive Croson).
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argue that because of the extreme nature of the remedy in affirmative action cases,
courts should look at all available evidence of discrimination before determining the
fate of a program that can positively affect minority business owners.'
D. Post-enactment Evidence Helps Courts Determine Whether an Affirmative
Action Plan Is Narrowly Tailored
The primary need for post-enactment evidence of discrimination is to satisfy the
compelling-interest prong of the strict scrutiny test by illuminating the existence of
racial discrimination. However, eliminating the viability of such evidence also
profoundly affects the narrow-tailoring requirement. Under Wygant and Croson, the
preference goals in an affirmative action plan must reflect the relevant labor pool as
determined in the compelling-interest leg of the inquiry. 52 Therefore, if minority
construction contractors in a particular city comprise 10% of the total number of
contractors and are receiving less than 1% of the city's annual contracts, the
affirmative action plan must be designed to allocate 10% of contracts to minorities.
If the program sets goals higher than 10% minority participation, the plan will fail the
narrow-tailoring test.2 ' Post-enactment evidence of discrimination can be used to
determine the current number of minority businesses in the relevant labor market and
how many projects or jobs are allocated to minority-owned enterprises.
The Concrete Works court took particular notice of the importance of post-
enactment evidence in determining whether an affirmative action plan is narrowly
tailored.'M In the Tenth Circuit case, the City of Denver first implemented the
challenged set-aside program in 1983, almost a decade prior to the lawsuit.'5
Particularly because the City frequently amended the program, the Concrete Works
court found post-enactment evidence of discrimination helpful to determining whether
the program's preference goals reflected the vast disparity studies and other findings
of discrimination compiled after the program's inception.' In the court's opinion,
"post-enactment evidence, if carefully scrutinized for its accuracy, will often prove
quite useful in evaluating the race-conscious program."'
V11. All Post-enactment Evidence Should Be Admitted
Any empirical critique of a district court's opinion should include a normative
solution. To accomplish this, a split among those circuit courts allowing post-
enactment evidence must be addressed.' While all of the circuit courts addressing
the issue of post-enactment evidence allow it under some circumstances, the Ninth and
251. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521-22.
252. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,502-03 (1989); cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
253. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75.
254. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1521-22.
255. Id. at 1515.
256. Id. at 1521.
257. Id.




Tenth Circuits only allow post-enactment evidence of discrimination after a showing
of some pre-enactment evidence.' The requirement of some pre-enactment evidence
of discrimination, according to those two circuits, ensures that the entity seeking to
implement the affirmative action program had a good-faith belief that discrimination
existed."w At first glance, this additional requirement set by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits appears to strike a middle ground between the wholesale use of post-
enactment evidence and the wholesale exclusion of the evidence. However, the
requirement of some pre-enactment evidence of discrimination before allowing post-
enactment evidence is an unnecessary and impractical prerequisite for two reasons.
First, requiring some pre-enactment evidence of discrimination before allowing post-
enactment evidence, if used to screen unconstitutional affirmative action programs,
will rarely prevent post-enactment evidence of discrimination from being admitted. In
Croson, the Supreme Court erased all doubts about the evidentiary standard required
for a state to maintain an affirmative action program."' Nearly a decade after this
mandate, most state and local governments have at least attempted to satisfy Croson's
high evidentiary requirements.' Few, if any, affirmative action programs are
implemented without some findings of past discrimination.' Thus, requiring some
pre-enactment evidence would impact an extremely small number of cases.
Second, even in those few cases in which an affirmative action plan is completely
unsupported by pre-enactment evidence, the court needs to look at all of the evidence
to make a just determination as to whether past discrimination exists. The concern that
a legislative body may impose an unconstitutional affirmative action program does not
increase if post-enactment evidence is admitted. If a legislative body arbitrarily
implements an affirmative action program without sufficient findings of past
discrimination, it should be reflected in the disparity study. If the study is flawed, a
judge or jury has an opportunity to review the post-enactment evidence. Therefore,
regardless of the presence of pre-enactment evidence of discrimination, courts should
consider post-enactment evidence of discrimination to determine whether a state had
a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination.
VIII. Conclusion
In Wygant and Croson, the Supreme Court seriously hindered a state's ability to
maintain affirmative action programs. However, the Court did not prohibit racial-
preference plans in all circumstances. In fact, the Supreme Court emphatically
recognized a need for affirmative action to repair certain past wrongs by the racial
majority. If a state is able to identify its past mistakes with a relative degree of
certainty, it may use affirmative action to repair the damage. District courts should not
259. Concrete Works. 36 F.3d at 1521; Coral Constr. Co. v. King County. 941 U.S. F.2d 910. 920
(9th Cir. 1991).
260. Coral, 941 F.2d at 920.
261. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 502-03 (1989).
262. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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deprive states of the ability to attempt racial healing in this limited manner until the
Supreme Court decides otherwise.
The district courts in West Tennessee and Associated Utility made a procedural
decision that effectively ended all affirmative action programs in their respective
jurisdictions. The courts read a mandate against post-enactment evidence of
discrimination into two Supreme Court opinions that did not actually confront the
issue. The district courts wanted to ensure that nonminority plaintiffs had the ability
to disprove the most accurate evidence available. In so doing, the courts completely
ignored the rights of those minorities who benefited from the affirmative action
programs. West Tennessee and Associated Utility ignored circuit authority and gave
precedential value to a misapplication of Wygant and Croson. The Sixth and Fourth
Circuits should respectively overrule West Tennessee and Associated Utility and allow
states the unencumbered ability to use post-enactment evidence of discrimination.
Additionally, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits should abandon the requirement of some
pre-enactment evidence of discrimination before admitting post-enactment evidence
of discrimination. Courts should consider all circumstantial evidence of past and
present discrimination to determine whether the governmental entity has a compelling
interest for maintaining the affirmative action program.
Andrew C. Jayne
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